On Thursday afternoon in London, when Ravindra Jadeja got spanked for 36 runs in four overs, Virat Kohli went up to MS Dhoni and talked about possible part-time bowling options. There were three available: Yuvraj Singh, Kedar Jadhav and Kohli himself.
“If Jadeja was finding it difficult, then obviously Yuvi would have found it difficult as well,” said the skipper post match. The duty was shared between Jadhav and Kohli then, and together they conceded 35 runs in six overs. On first look, it isn’t a poor return. But then, you make two additions to this figure and suddenly it looks very different.
First, add Jadeja’s initial spell, and it reads 0/71 from 10 overs for India’s fifth bowler. Jadeja bowled another two overs afterwards, and gave away another 16 runs. Now, add Hardik Pandya’s total spell to this whole period of play: 7-1-51-0.
In essence then, India’s fourth and fifth bowlers – 19 overs spread across Jadeja, Pandya, Jadhav and Kohli – went for 138 runs for 0 wickets, an economy of 7.26 per over. In modern-day ODI cricket, defending 322 runs, this is simply unacceptable, and precisely where India lost the plot.
Leaving out Ashwin
At this juncture, you want to ask if India made a mistake in leaving R Ashwin out for the second match in succession. As easy as the answer may sound, given how Sri Lanka romped home with eight balls to spare, this selection call is not so simple. In three of his last five ODIs, Ashwin has failed to complete his quota of 10 overs.
Additionally, this playing 11 worked against Pakistan, despite its one obvious weakness. As Kohli put it, there will be days when the opposition plays well and your plans come a cropper.
Even so, it is too easy to just put the tag of “a bad day in office” on this defeat. It wasn’t as if the match ended in a last ball – last over even – thriller, no. An inexperienced, but ebullient, Lankan line-up claimed victory with ease. They chased down 320-plus with consummate ease, losing only three wickets and with eight balls to spare.
Perhaps it could have confounded those watching less if it had been England or South Africa, but the manner in which India’s bowling failed as a whole – two out of three wickets were run-outs – cannot be ignored.
Again, it goes back to how Lankan batsmen negated Jadeja’s threat by attacking him from the word go. When he failed to contain them – a rarity by his standards – India didn’t have an optimal back-up option. It warrants a deeper look into how this Indian team picks its bowling combination. A five-bowler attack is the norm, and it has been so for a long time now.
Fazing out part-timers
It was in October 2012 when this rule of two new balls from both ends came into effect. The BCCI, along with Pakistan and Sri Lankan cricket boards, had lobbied hard for a reversal, but that didn’t happen.
Until then, then skipper Dhoni made sure that India used its traditional strength in ODIs – reliably long batting line-up, plus back-up spin options irrespective of conditions. Whether playing home or away, he could vary the number of his prime bowlers – two pacers/spinners or three pacers/one spinner – thanks largely to part-time alternatives available to him.
But this rule forced Dhoni – and team India therein – to change approach. Herein, let us go back to 2013, wherein India hosted Australia for seven ODIs in October. In that high-scoring contest, Australia crossed the 300-mark in five out of six matches, with 295/8 at Ranchi their lowest score of that series. It was a time when Yuvraj and Suresh Raina were still very much in vogue as all-rounders, and both were deployed at different times, though without success.
Yuvraj bowled only 14 overs in that series, and Raina only 10. Even Kohli had bowled (four overs), but primary bowlers shared majority of the workload. In every game, Dhoni deployed a five-pronged attack – three pacers/two spinners mostly – and only went to his part-timers because one of the main bowlers would get hit, given the explosive nature of that series.
Gradually, the utility of part-timers decreased for India over time. Since that 2013 series against Australia, Yuvraj has played only 10 ODIs until Thursday – he has bowled in only two of them. The last time he bowled more than five overs in an ODI was in Pune (2013), and the last time he completed a 10-over spell in ODI cricket was the 2011 World Cup final. Do you get the drift?
Dhoni slowly faded out the usage of part-timer bowlers from India’s ODI strategy, and it was necessary to keep up with this measure to adapt to the two new balls, particularly keeping in mind the 2015 ODI World Cup. Going into that tournament, Yuvraj was out of contention but Raina and Ambati Rayudu were the part-timers available to Dhoni.
Raina only sent down 15 overs in four out of eight matches in that World Cup, while Rayudu was never brought into the attack even once, as the five-pronged attack carried India to the semi-final. In essence then, Raina was the last quintessential part-timer, who took four wickets in as many matches (economy 4.68) the last time he played in England (2014). With him out of the side currently, this aspect of ODI cricket – although seemingly vital to team India’s fortunes – looks lost.
Why no second spinner?
Again then, you think about team selection. A lack of part-time bowlers means the Indian attack looks pretty one-dimensional with four fast bowlers. Additionally, there is also the swing factor. Throughout this tournament, the white ball hasn’t swung much, underlining once again the direction of ODI cricket at present.
The batsmen have everything loaded in their favour. That Kohli had to come in and bowl signifies that a lack of pace on the ball was thought to be an optimal solution to Lanka’s calculated attack. In that scenario, isn’t it better to play the second spinner?
“We didn’t have any swing in Birmingham either, and we bowled pretty well,” Kohli said. “I thought we had enough runs midway, but they kept striking the ball well. You trust your bowlers to control runs – sometimes it comes off, sometimes it doesn’t. You back a side and go with it. You always see hindsight when you lose games of cricket,” added the dejected Indian skipper after the loss.
In the immediacy of this loss, it is tough to put a finger on whether India went with the right or wrong team combination. The team management picked an 11 based on opposition and conditions, but it backfired. You want to play seven batsmen, as well as someone who can bowl, sure. You also want enough pacers, and balance it with one spinner, fine.
The bigger concern, though, ought to be that in trying to address the team’s balance in such conditions, India are moving away from their traditional strength. Look at this situation whichever way you want, but if Kohli needs to bowl, it means that India’s worst possible fears have come to pass.